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CUTTING THE FINANCIAL FAT FROM THE 
FAILING FIRM DEFENSE:  
REFOCUSING THE FAILING FIRM 
DEFENSE ON ANTITRUST LAW 
KYLE DIGANGI† 
INTRODUCTION 
Firms in danger of failure often hope to sell their assets to a 
more financially stable entity.  Sometimes such sales occur in the 
context of bankruptcy.1  However, antitrust law often stands in 
the way of these transactions when the sale is anticompetitive.  
This is because Section 7 of the Clayton Act prohibits mergers 
and acquisitions that may substantially lessen competition, 
regardless of a firm’s financial condition.2  Instead, 
anticompetitive sales are permissible only when the 
requirements of the “failing firm defense” are met.  The failing 
firm defense creates a narrow exception for failing firms to 
complete an acquisition that would otherwise violate the 
antitrust laws.  
The failing firm defense allows an otherwise anticompetitive 
merger to go forward if the firm being acquired is “failing” 
according to antitrust law.  Failing in an antitrust sense does not 
mean losing money alone.3  Rather, to be considered failing in 
antitrust, a firm must meet the following conditions: (1) the firm 
 
† Articles Editor, St. John’s Law Review; J.D. Candidate, 2012, St. John’s 
University School of Law. I would like to thank Professor Keith Sharfman for all his 
hard work, dedication and guidance during this Note writing process. I would also 
like to thank my family and friends for all of their support. 
1 Under Chapter 11 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code, Section 363(b) states that 
“[t]he trustee, after notice and a hearing, may use, sell, or lease, other than in the 
ordinary course of business, property of the estate.” 11 U.S.C.A. § 363(b)(1) (West 
2011).  
2 See 15 U.S.C.A. § 18 (West 2011).  
3 Carl Shapiro, Deputy Assistant Att’y Gen. for Econ., Antitrust Div., Remarks 
on Competition Policy in Distressed Industries 21 (May 13, 2009), 
http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/speeches/245857.htm [hereinafter Remarks by 
Shapiro]. 
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is “unable to pay its bills in the near future”; (2) the “firm could 
not successfully reorganize in bankruptcy”; (3) “the firm has tried 
to sell itself to someone else, in a combination that will not lessen 
competition as much”; and (4) “the firm’s assets will exit the 
[relevant] market” “without the acquisition.”4  The doctrine is 
principally founded upon the rationale that “if a firm is failing, 
then on balance it may be better to allow” a merger with a 
competitor “than to watch” its “assets leave the market and be 
unavailable to any competitor.”5  This Note argues that the third 
and fourth elements are essential to proving the failing firm 
defense, while showing that the first and second elements are 
neither necessary nor consistent with antitrust law. 
The most widely accepted version of the failing firm defense 
is the form adopted by the Department of Justice and the Federal 
Trade Commission (“Antitrust Regulators”)6 in the Horizontal 
Merger Guidelines.7  For almost twenty years, the 1992 
Horizontal Merger Guidelines (“1992 Merger Guidelines”) 
articulated a rigid test for using the failing firm defense that 
required not only that a firm be financially distressed, but also 
that there be no alternative purchasers and that the firm’s assets 
would exit the relevant market absent the acquisition.8  Although 
Antitrust Regulators might not have intended for the failing firm 
defense to be analyzed differently, the 2010 Horizontal Merger 
Guidelines9 (“2010 Merger Guidelines”; “1992 Merger Guidelines” 
and “2010 Merger Guidelines,” collectively “Horizontal Merger 
Guidelines”) may have loosened the stringent requirements of 
the 1992 Merger Guidelines.  The 2010 version of the failing firm 
defense deemphasizes the importance of the “assets exiting the 
relevant market” requirement by changing it from an 
 
4 J. Bruce McDonald, Deputy Assistant Att’y Gen., Antitrust Div., Remarks on 
Antitrust for Airlines 8 (Nov. 3, 2005), http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/ 
speeches/217987.htm. 
5 Id. 
6 Hereinafter, the Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission 
will be referred to as the “Antitrust Regulators.” 
7 See Troy Paredes, Note, Turning the Failing Firm Defense into a Success: A 
Proposal to Revise the Horizontal Merger Guidelines, 13 YALE J. ON REG. 347, 352–53 
(1996) (providing an overview of the failing firm defense). 
8 1992 Horizontal Merger Guidelines, 57 Fed. Reg. 41,552, 41,563 (Sept. 10, 
1992). 
9 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, HORIZONTAL MERGER 
GUIDELINES 1 n.1 (2010), available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/guidelines/ 
hmg-2010.pdf [hereinafter 2010 HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES]. 
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independent element to an element that is automatically 
satisfied if three other elements are met.10  If Antitrust 
Regulators do not analyze separately whether a firm’s assets 
would exit the relevant market, it would be easier for firms only 
in financial distress to use the failing firm defense. 
Recent years have witnessed a trend towards making it 
easier for financially distressed firms to use the failing firm 
defense in bankruptcy.  Although transactions in bankruptcy are 
likely to raise failing firm issues,11 bankruptcy is not enough to 
invoke the failing firm defense.  Today, the Antitrust Regulators’ 
primary, and often exclusive, reliance on the target firm’s 
balance sheet and income statement to determine whether a firm 
is failing is due to a misunderstanding of the failing firm 
defense.12  Failing financially is not the same as failing in the 
antitrust sense because being unable to pay bills in the short-
term and being unable to reorganize in bankruptcy are 
bankruptcy elements that do not impact antitrust law, which 
focuses on the protection of competition and consumers.13  The 
failing firm defense should rely heavily on the assets exiting the 
relevant market requirement and the alternative purchaser 
requirement because they are the only elements that concern 
antitrust law.  Thus, a firm failing financially in bankruptcy 
cannot automatically use the failing firm defense. 
This Note proposes that the failing firm defense be 
strengthened to an “Assets Exiting Defense,”14 which would allow 
an otherwise anticompetitive merger to go forward only if there 
are no other alternative purchasers that would make the 
acquisition less anticompetitive and if the target firm’s assets 
would exit the relevant market without the acquisition.  A 
stronger “Assets Exiting Defense” that focuses exclusively on 
antitrust principles is necessary because in a distressed economy, 
 
10 See infra Section I. 
11 See Bernard A. Nigro, Jr. & Jonathan S. Kanter, The Effect of Market 
Conditions on Merger Review—Distressed Industries, Failing Firms, and Mergers 
with Bankrupt Companies, A.B.A. ANNUAL SPRING MEETING 7–8 (Apr. 2, 2003), 
http://www.abanet.org/antitrust/at-committees/attelecom/pdf/distressedindustry.pdf. 
12 See Paredes, supra note 7, at 375. 
13 See Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-o-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 488 (1977). 
14 The “exiting assets” defense was first suggested by John Kwoka and Frederick 
Warren-Boulton. See John E. Kwoka, Jr. & Frederick R. Warren-Boulton, 
Efficiencies, Failing Firms, and Alternatives to Merger: A Policy Synthesis, 31 
ANTITRUST BULL. 431, 446 (1986). 
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the current failing firm defense could become an escape hatch for 
anticompetitive transactions involving firms that are only in 
financial distress.  This Note argues that the assets exiting the 
market requirement is crucial for antitrust purposes, that the 
requirement has not been consistently considered by Antitrust 
Regulators, and that removing it from the list of elements in the 
2010 merger guidelines makes the failing firm defense easier to 
use by firms only in financial distress.  Part I provides an 
overview of the failing firm defense and its history.  Part II 
explains the conceptual underpinnings of the failing firm defense 
and how the elements of the defense have been analyzed.  Part 
III examines the application of the 1992 Merger Guidelines 
version of the failing firm defense in the Trans World Airlines 
(“TWA”) merger with American Airlines and the future 
application of the defense after the newly created 2010 Merger 
Guidelines.  This Part concludes that Antitrust Regulators have 
been allowing firms that are only financially distressed to use the 
defense, as opposed to firms that are failing in the antitrust 
sense.  Part IV proposes using an “Assets Exiting Defense” to 
replace the current failing firm defense.  An “Assets Exiting 
Defense” would ensure that Antitrust Regulators focus 
exclusively on antitrust principles and do not apply the defense 
too broadly to include anticompetitive transactions involving 
firms only in financial distress.  The purpose of the defense 
should be to protect competition, not to protect firms from failing 
in a distressed economy.   
I. OVERVIEW OF THE FAILING FIRM DOCTRINE 
The failing firm defense is only considered if the prima facie 
case shows that the transaction is presumptively 
anticompetitive.15  “The failing firm doctrine permits an 
otherwise anticompetitive merger or acquisition if the” defendant 
or proponent of the merger can demonstrate that the acquired 
firm would fail absent the transaction.16  It was judicially created  
 
 
 
 
15 See PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW: AN 
ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES AND THEIR APPLICATION 273 (3d ed. 2009). 
16 See Paredes, supra note 7, at 352. 
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in the 1930 Supreme Court decision International Shoe Co. v. 
Federal Trade Commission17 in a famous and oft-quoted passage, 
where Justice Sutherland wrote: 
In the light of the case thus disclosed of a corporation with 
resources so depleted and the prospect of rehabilitation so 
remote that it faced the grave probability of a business failure 
with resulting loss to its stockholders and injury to the 
communities where its plants were operated, we hold that the 
purchase of its capital stock by a competitor (there being no 
other prospective purchaser), not with a purpose to lessen 
competition, but to facilitate the accumulated business of the 
purchaser and with the effect of mitigating seriously injurious 
consequences otherwise probable, is not in contemplation of law 
prejudicial to the public and does not substantially lessen 
competition or restrain commerce within the intent of the 
Clayton Act.18 
“The grave probability of a business failure” language is not 
only the first articulation of the defense, but also led to the 
development of a two-prong test that was confirmed in United 
States v. Greater Buffalo Press, Inc.19 in 1971 and in United 
States v. General Dynamics Corp.20 in 1974.21  The Court in 
Greater Buffalo Press said that in order to be considered failing, a 
firm must show “(1) that the resources of [the company] were ‘so 
depleted and the prospect of rehabilitation so remote that it faced 
the grave possibility of a business failure’ and (2) that there was 
no other prospective purchaser for it.”22  The Court determined 
that “an acquisition that would otherwise violate the antitrust 
laws may proceed if the acquired company is a failing firm.”23  
Some courts have also added a third element: that the failing 
firm could not be reorganized successfully.24  These elements 
imply that the firm would “very likely disappear from” the 
 
17 280 U.S. 291 (1930). 
18 Id. at 302–03 (emphasis added).  
19 402 U.S. 549, 555 (1971).  
20 415 U.S. 486, 506–07 (1974). 
21 This language is still used verbatim in describing the financial distress prong 
of the failing firm test. See, e.g., United States v. Gen. Dynamics Corp., 415 U.S. 486, 
507 (1974); United States v. Greater Buffalo Press, Inc., 402 U.S. 549, 555 (1971); 
Citizen Publ’g Co. v. United States, 394 U.S. 131, 137 (1969). 
22 402 U.S. at 555; see also Gen. Dynamics Corp., 415 U.S. at 507. 
23 See Joel G. Chefitz, A Tale of Two Mergers: American/TWA and 
United/USAir, 14 DEPAUL BUS. L.J. 215, 216 (2002). 
24 See Citizen Publ’g Co., 394 U.S. at 138. 
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relevant market unless the firm was rescued by a merger.25  After 
the Supreme Court’s creation of the failing firm doctrine, 
Congress also explicitly acknowledged the existence of the failing 
firm defense for actions challenging otherwise unlawful mergers 
or acquisitions.26 
While the failing firm defense is well established in United 
States case law and in Congress, “most merger work is done at 
the agency level, with only a small percentage reaching the 
courts.”27  After the Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements 
Act of 1976,28 the failing firm defense battleground has shifted 
from the courtroom to pre-merger filings and investigations by 
Antitrust Regulators.29  If in their pre-merger investigations, 
which include efficiencies analysis and the technical expertise of  
 
 
 
 
25 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 15, at 283. 
26 The Senate Report on the 1950 amendments to § 7 of the Clayton Act stated: 
The argument has been made that the proposed bill, if passed, would have 
the effect of preventing a company which is in a failing or bankrupt 
condition from selling out. The committee are [sic] in full accord with the 
proposition that any firm in such a condition should be free to dispose of its 
stock or assets. The committee however, do [sic] not believe that the 
proposed bill will prevent sales of this type. The judicial interpretation on 
this point goes back many years and is abundantly clear. According to 
decisions of the Supreme Court, the Clayton Act does not apply in 
bankruptcy or receivership cases. Moreover, the Court has held, with 
respect to this specific section, that a company does not have to be actually 
in a state of bankruptcy to be exempt from its provisions; it is sufficient 
that it is heading in that direction with the probability that bankruptcy 
will ensue. 
S. REP. NO. 81-1775, at 7 (1950), reprinted in 1950 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4293, 4299; accord 
H.R. REP. NO. 81-1191, at 6–7 (1949). 
27 See Lauren N. Norris, The Failing Firm Defense (July 2010), available at 
http://www.klgates.com/files/Publication/1ae9fe1f-ab0e-49cb-8527-00ac4fc754e7/ 
Presentation/PublicationAttachment/9c1d5211-abbf-4217-a7ea-0756cc43c192/ 
Norris_Failing FirmDefense.pdf. 
28 The Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-
435, §§ 201, 202, 90 Stat. 1383 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15, 18, 
and 28 U.S.C.), provides pre-merger filing requirements that vastly changed merger 
law and practice. For a review of the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act’s effect on merger 
practice, see Joe Sims & Deborah P. Herman, The Effect of Twenty Years of Hart-
Scott-Rodino on Merger Practice: A Case Study in the Law of Unintended 
Consequences Applied to Antitrust Legislation, 65 ANTITRUST L.J. 865, 866 (1997). 
29 See Oliver Zhong, Note, The Failing Company Defense After the Commentary: 
Let it Go, 41 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 745, 747 (2008) (suggesting that the failing firm 
defense should no longer be recognized). 
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economists, Antitrust Regulators determine that the merger will 
be unlawful according to the Horizontal Merger Guidelines, they 
will challenge the merger.30   
Today, the most widely accepted version of the failing firm 
defense is that created by the Antitrust Regulators in the 
Horizontal Merger Guidelines.31  The Horizontal Merger 
Guidelines were created to “outline how the federal agencies 
evaluate the likely competitive impact of mergers and whether 
those mergers comply with U.S. antitrust law.”32  The Horizontal 
Merger Guidelines were adopted in 1968 and revised in 1982, 
1984, 1992, and, most recently, 2010.33  Revisions in the 
Horizontal Merger Guidelines are supposed to reflect changes in 
enforcement policy.34  For eighteen years the 1992 Merger 
Guidelines provided that: 
A merger is not likely to create or enhance market power or 
facilitate its exercise if the following circumstances are met: 
(1) The allegedly failing firm would be unable to meet its 
financial obligations in the near future; (2) it would not be able 
to reorganize successfully under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy 
Act; (3) it has made unsuccessful good-faith efforts to elicit 
reasonable alternative offers of acquisition of the assets of the 
failing firm that would both keep its tangible and intangible 
assets in the relevant market and pose a less severe danger to 
competition than does the proposed merger; and (4) absent the 
acquisition, the assets of the failing firm would exit the relevant 
market.35 
After the 1992 Merger Guidelines were criticized for being so 
narrowly defined,36 the failing firm defense was revised in 2010.  
The revised guidelines appear to be the same as the 1992 Merger 
 
30 See id. 
31 See Paredes, supra note 7, at 352–53. 
32 Cecelia M. Assam, Revised Horizontal Merger Guidelines Offer Glimpse of 
Premerger Analysis by DOJ, FTC, 99 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. 231, 231 (2010) 
(internal quotiation marks omitted). 
33 See id. at 232. 
34 2010 HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 9, at 1 n.1. 
35 1992 Horizontal Merger Guidelines, 57 Fed. Reg. 41,552, 41,563 (Sept. 10, 
1992). 
36 See Debra A. Valentine, Deputy Director, Horizontal Issues: What’s 
Happening and What’s on the Horizon, FED. TRADE COMM’N (Dec. 8, 1995), 
http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/other/dvhorizontalissues.shtm; Edward O. Correia, Re-
Examining the Failing Company Defense, 64 ANTITRUST L.J. 683, 691 (1996); J. 
Bruce McDonald, Deputy Assistant Att’y Gen., Antitrust Div., Remarks on Antitrust 
for Airlines 8 (Nov. 3, 2005), http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/speeches/217987.htm. 
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Guidelines, but the 2010 version of the failing firm defense does 
not explicitly list the fourth element—that absent the 
acquisition, the assets of the failing firm would exit the relevant 
market.  The 2010 Merger Guidelines provide: 
The Agencies do not normally credit claims that the assets of the 
failing firm would exit the relevant market unless all of the 
following circumstances are met: (1) the allegedly failing firm 
would be unable to meet its financial obligations in the near 
future; (2) it would not be able to reorganize successfully under 
Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Act; and (3) it has made 
unsuccessful good-faith efforts to elicit reasonable alternative 
offers that would keep its tangible and intangible assets in the 
relevant market and pose a less severe danger to competition 
than does the proposed merger.37 
While substantively the 1992 and the 2010 Merger 
Guidelines appear similar, it appears that the 2010 version of the 
failing firm defense does not require analyzing whether the 
assets of a firm would exit the relevant market as a separate 
element.  Instead, the 2010 version seems to indicate that the 
assets exiting the relevant market requirement is automatically 
met so long as the three other elements are met.  This 
interpretation would substantially loosen the strict requirements 
of the 1992 Merger Guidelines because instead of analyzing all 
four elements, Antitrust Regulators may now be implying that if 
the first three elements are met, the assets exiting the relevant 
market element is also fulfilled and need not be analyzed 
separately.   
While the wording in the Horizontal Merger Guidelines is 
slightly different from the case law, the analysis of whether a 
firm is failing is essentially the same.  Thus, Antitrust 
Regulators and courts have strictly enforced the requirements of 
the failing firm defense from the Horizontal Merger Guidelines 
because the failing firm defense is widely believed to be an 
absolute defense, ending all inquires into the transaction’s likely 
anticompetitive effects.38  Because the failing firm defense may 
 
37 2010 HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 9, at 32 (emphasis 
added). 
38 See, e.g., Dr. Pepper/Seven-Up Cos. v. FTC, 991 F.2d 859, 864–65 (D.C. Cir. 
1993); FTC v. Univ. Health, Inc., 938 F.2d 1206, 1220 n.28 (11th Cir. 1991); United 
States v. Syufy Enters., 903 F.2d 659, 673 n.24 (9th Cir. 1990); Mich. Citizens for an 
Indep. Press v. Thornburgh, 868 F.2d 1285, 1288 (D.C. Cir. 1989), aff’d by an equally 
divided court, 493 U.S. 38 (1989); Erie Sand & Gravel Co. v. FTC, 291 F.2d 279, 280 
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allow an anticompetitive merger or acquisition, the burden of 
proof falls on the defendant or proponent of the merger to prove 
all of the elements.39   
“[I]t is not surprising that the failing firm defense has 
become well-established in antitrust law” because “mergers and 
acquisitions often involve firms that are financially weak.”40  
Because firms that are financially weak usually file for 
bankruptcy, it is no wonder why the failing firm defense is often 
raised in bankruptcy.  However, the defense should focus solely 
on antitrust principles and should not be applied too broadly to 
include anticompetitive transactions involving firms only in 
financial distress.  The purpose of the defense should be to 
protect competition, not to protect firms from failing in a 
distressed economy.   
II. CONCEPTUAL UNDERPINNINGS 
Antitrust Regulators analyze four main elements when 
applying the failing firm defense.  Part II of this Note explains 
how each element of the failing firm defense is analyzed and 
briefly examines the approaches used by bankruptcy courts and 
Antitrust Regulators when reviewing offers for a failing 
company.  Part II.A through II.D will provide an in-depth 
analysis of each element of the failing firm defense.  Part II.E 
examines the standards used by Antitrust Regulators and the 
bankruptcy courts when reviewing offers for a failing company 
through Dr. Pepper/Seven-Up Companies, Inc. v. Federal Trade 
Commission.41  The facts of Dr. Pepper show that a firm can be 
failing financially in bankruptcy, but still not meet all the 
requirements necessary for the failing firm defense because two 
of the elements do not focus on bankruptcy at all.   
 
(3d Cir. 1961); FTC v. Harbour Grp. Invs., Civ. A. No. 90-2525, 1990 WL 198819, at 
*2 (D.C. Cir. Nov. 19, 1990); Joseph Ciccone & Sons, Inc. v. Eastern Indus., 537 F. 
Supp. 623, 628 (E.D. Pa. 1982); United States v. M.P.M., Inc., 397 F. Supp. 78, 95 (D. 
Colo. 1975); United States v. Md. & Va. Milk Producers Ass’n, 167 F. Supp. 799, 808 
(D.D.C. 1958), aff’d in part, rev’d in part on other grounds, 362 U.S. 458 (1960). 
39 See Paredes, supra note 7, at 353. 
40 Id. at 354. 
41 798 F. Supp. 762 (D.D.C. 1992). 
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A. The Inability To Meet Financial Obligations in the Near 
Future Requirement 
First, the failing firm defense requires the allegedly failing 
firm to prove that it is unable to meet its financial obligations in 
the near future.  There is no checklist to determine if a firm 
cannot meet its financial obligations in the near future.42  This 
requirement must be carefully analyzed on a case-by-case basis.43  
However, “negative current profits” or “a decline in sales” are 
“insufficient to demonstrate that a firm would be unable to meet 
its financial obligations” in the near future.44  The main concern 
when determining whether a firm can meet its financial 
obligations is whether the firm has sufficient cash flow.45  Other 
factors that Antitrust Regulators consider include:  
1) Whether a company’s costs are greater than its 
revenue46 
2) Whether total liabilities exceed total assets over a 
period of time47 
3) Whether a company’s short term losses are likely to be 
repeated48 
4) Whether a company has the ability “to obtain new 
revenues or . . . customers”49 
5) Whether the company’s “productivity is declining”50 
6) Whether the “supply of key inputs . . . is being 
exhausted”51 
7) Whether the company is being run poorly by current 
management52 
8) Whether a company’s financial problems are part of 
“an irreversible downward trend”53 
 
42 ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION AND DEV., POLICY ROUNDTABLES: THE 
FAILING FIRM DEFENCE 2009 177 (2009), http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/16/27/ 
45810821.pdf [hereinafter THE FAILING FIRM DEFENCE]. 
43 Id. 
44 Id. 
45 THE FAILING FIRM DEFENCE, supra note 42, at 177.  
46 Id. 
47 See California v. Sutter Health Sys., 130 F. Supp. 2d 1109, 1134–35 (N.D. Cal. 
2001). 
48 See KEN HEYER & SHELDON KIMMEL, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS GROUP 
DISCUSSION PAPER: MERGER REVIEW OF FIRMS IN FINANCIAL DISTRESS 4–6 (2009), 
http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/eag/244098.pdf. 
49 THE FAILING FIRM DEFENCE, supra note 42, at 177. 
50 See HEYER & KIMMEL, supra note 48, at 4. 
51 Id. 
52 Id. 
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9) Whether the firm is more attributable to the “general, 
and temporary, depressed state of the economy”54 
10) “[W]hether the company’s pre-merger, ordinary course 
of business documents reveal an imminent financial 
failure, or if the claims of failure appear to be invented 
to help defend the merger”55 
None of these factors is determinative, but antitrust 
regulators will consider them when analyzing whether the firm is 
unable to meet financial obligations in the near future.  Because 
being unable to meet financial obligations in the near future 
focuses solely on whether a firm is financially distressed, this 
element by itself has no implication on antitrust law. 
B. The Inability To Reorganize in Bankruptcy Requirement 
Second, the failing firm defense requires that the allegedly 
failing firm prove that it is unable to reorganize in bankruptcy.56  
To determine whether a company is unable to reorganize in 
bankruptcy, antitrust regulators consider “whether the 
elimination of the company’s debt through a bankruptcy 
proceeding could correct the company’s financial problems.”57  
 
53 THE FAILING FIRM DEFENCE, supra note 42, at 177. 
54 Id. 
55 Id. at 177–78. 
56 THE FAILING FIRM DEFENCE, supra note 42, at 178 n.23 (2009). 
[U]nder Chapter 11 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. §§ 1101–1116, 
any company may initiate a bankruptcy reorganization proceeding. Once it 
files its reorganization petition, the company continues to operate, typically 
under the control of current management, and is given a wide variety of 
statutory powers to cancel or renegotiate contracts, use collateral to borrow 
additional funds, rescale its operations, and modify its debt and equity 
structure. Creditors may not initiate legal action against the company 
outside the bankruptcy process. Ultimately, the company will propose a 
plan of reorganization to keep its business alive and pay creditors over 
time. The court must approve the plan, and certain debts incurred prior to 
the filing of the bankruptcy petition will be discharged. The turnaround 
period may involve years of operation in Chapter 11 reorganization, until 
an economically viable business can be assured. If no feasible 
reorganization plan can be formulated, then, under a Chapter 7 liquidation 
proceeding, the assets of the company may be liquidated by a trustee, and 
the proceeds distributed pursuant to the priorities set forth in Chapter 7 of 
the Bankruptcy Code. 11 U.S.C. §§ 701–716. 
Id. 
57 See id. at 178; see also United States v. Reed Roller Bit Co., 274 F. Supp. 573, 
584 (W.D. Okla. 1967) (finding that although a company’s poor performance made it 
an unattractive subsidiary, “it was not near bankruptcy, and it does not appear that 
it would have been in the absence of merger”). 
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“[R]eorganization may not be possible” if “the company is unable 
to meet its current and expected operating expenses from its 
expected revenues, or [if its] capital has been exhausted.”58   
Antitrust Regulators will also “consider the company’s 
projections for improving its condition and whether the company 
has a viable plan going forward.”59  A company’s decision to 
liquidate is not enough to create a failing firm situation unless 
the company’s economic condition is beyond the prospect of 
liquidation.60  Antitrust Regulators may also “talk to the 
company’s creditors to determine whether they can or will work 
out a plan to restructure the company’s debts.”61  If a company’s 
future prospects are promising, creditors may be willing to 
restructure loans, or loan additional funds to keep it in 
business.62  Because being unable to reorganize in bankruptcy 
focuses solely on whether a firm is financially distressed, this 
element by itself does not concern antitrust law. 
C. The No Alternative Purchaser Less Detrimental to 
Competition Requirement 
Third, the failing firm defense requires that the allegedly 
failing firm prove that there are no other reasonable alternatives 
less detrimental to competition.  The Supreme Court has stated 
that “[t]he failing company doctrine plainly cannot be applied in 
a merger or in any other case unless it is established that the 
company that acquires the failing company or brings it under 
dominion is the only available purchaser.”63  Courts interpreting 
this requirement describe its burden as “quite heavy,”64 and hold 
litigants asserting the defense to a showing that good faith 
efforts were made to find an alternative purchaser.65  The 
guidelines state that “[a]ny offer to purchase the assets of the 
failing firm for a price above the liquidation value of those assets 
 
58 See THE FAILING FIRM DEFENCE, supra note 42, at 178. 
59 Id. 
60 See Reed Roller Bit Co., 274 F. Supp. at 584 (citing Erie Sand & Gravel Co. v. 
FTC, 291 F.2d 279 (3d Cir. 1961)). 
61 THE FAILING FIRM DEFENCE, supra note 42, at 178. 
62 See HEYER & KIMMEL, supra note 48, at 6. 
63 Citizen Publ’g Co. v. United States, 394 U.S. 131, 138 (1969) (emphasis 
added). 
64 FTC v. Harbour Grp. Invs., Civ. A. No. 90-2525, 1990 WL 198819, at *3 
(D.D.C. Nov. 19, 1990) (citing Citizen Publ’g Co., 394 U.S. at 138). 
65 See id. at *3, *6. 
WF_DiGangi (Do Not Delete) 12/7/2012  8:31 AM 
2012] CUTTING THE FINANCIAL FAT 289 
will be regarded as a reasonable alternative.”66  Additionally, the 
alternative purchaser should appear willing and able to keep the 
assets operating in the market in order to be preferred over the 
competitor.67  Antitrust Regulators might also “require a less 
anticompetitive purchaser, even if it offers a lower price than the 
proposed” merger.68 
Determining whether a company sufficiently pursued 
alternative purchasers can be difficult.  Antitrust Regulators 
require that the assets of the allegedly failing company be 
“shopped” before determining that a company is entitled to the 
failing firm defense.69  This sends a “signal to prospective sellers 
that the search must be thorough and genuine.”70  Requiring a 
genuine effort to find an alternative purchaser ensures that there 
is “a good picture of the prospects for another buyer” by the time 
the proposed merger reaches the stage of review by Antitrust 
Regulators.71  The nature and size of the relevant market will 
determine the scope of the “shopping.”72  Antitrust Regulators 
require: (1) that a number and variety of companies be contacted, 
including investment groups or companies from related 
industries,” (2) that sufficient information be provided to 
companies expressing interest,” and (3) “that legitimate 
expressions of interest be pursued seriously.”73 
 
 
 
66 2010 HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 9, at 32 n.16. 
67 See 1992 Horizontal Merger Guidelines, 57 Fed. Reg. 41,552, 41,563 (Sept. 10, 
1992). 
68 ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS: 
UNDERSTANDING THE ANTITRUST ISSUES 282 (3d ed. 2008). 
69 See HEYER & KIMMEL, supra note 48, at 5. 
70 Correia, supra note 36, at 693. Cases such as FTC v. Harbour Group 
Investments L.P., 1990 WL 198819 (D.D.C. 1990), which resulted in a preliminary 
injunction because of an inadequate search, make the point well. See also Olin Corp. 
v. FTC, 986 F.2d 1295, 1307 (9th Cir. 1993) (requiring a search for an alternative 
purchaser even though assets would have exited the market in the absence of 
merger). 
71 See Correia, supra note 36, at 693–94. 
72 THE FAILING FIRM DEFENCE, supra note 42, at 179. For example, “contact[ing] 
only a few purchasers when the relevant market was small and unattractive to 
potential purchasers,” and requiring many purchasers when the relevant market 
was large and more attractive to potential purchasers, are factors that determine 
the scope of “shopping.” Id. n.29. 
73 See THE FAILING FIRM DEFENCE, supra note 42, at 179. 
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The burden is on the defendant or proponent of the merger to 
demonstrate that there are no reasonable alternative purchasers 
less detrimental to competition.74  Antitrust Regulators are not 
obligated to find another willing purchaser.75  However, the fact 
that Antitrust Regulators “cannot . . . find another interested 
purchaser may be persuasive evidence that the merging firm’s 
unsuccessful ‘shop’ was adequate.”76  General expressions of 
interest from alternative purchasers do not constitute reasonable 
alternative offers, unless there are extensions of an actual offer.77  
Because finding an alternative purchaser less detrimental to 
competition affects competition, this element directly concerns 
antitrust law. 
D. The Assets Exiting the Relevant Market Requirement 
Lastly, the failing firm defense requires that, absent the 
acquisition, the assets of the firm would exit the relevant market.  
Should that occur, then “by definition [the firm’s] assets would be 
providing no competitive [re]straint [on] the market at all.”78  
Simply showing that no alternative purchaser can be found does 
not prove “that the allegedly failing firm would itself liquidate 
rather than continue to operate the assets in the [relevant] 
market.”79  Because the evidence given to Antitrust Regulators 
“often rests largely in the hands of the allegedly failing firm,” “it 
can be difficult to determine whether the assets would exit the 
market.”80  
The allegedly failing firm should be able to provide Antitrust 
Regulators with “objective evidence sufficient to show that it is 
not more profitable for it to continue to operate the assets in the 
market than to have them employed elsewhere—such  as 
through liquidation.”81  Some courts require evidence that the 
firm made a decision to close its business in the near future.82  
The fact that a firm with market power offers to buy it might be 
 
74 See Paredes, supra note 7, at 353. 
75 THE FAILING FIRM DEFENCE, supra note 42, at 179. 
76 Id.  
77 See California v. Sutter Health Sys., 130 F. Supp. 2d 1109, 1137 (N.D. Cal. 
2001); United States v. Culbro Corp., 504 F. Supp. 661, 669 (S.D.N.Y. 1981). 
78 HEYER & KIMMEL, supra note 48, at 6. 
79 See THE FAILING FIRM DEFENCE, supra note 42, at 179. 
80 See id. 
81 See id. 
82 Olin Corp. v. FTC, 986 F.2d 1295, 1307 (9th Cir. 1993). 
WF_DiGangi (Do Not Delete) 12/7/2012  8:31 AM 
2012] CUTTING THE FINANCIAL FAT 291 
“evidence that its assets are in certain ways useful.”83  If a firm’s 
assets still have value they will likely not leave the market 
absent the acquisition and therefore the failing firm defense 
would not apply.  Because determining whether a firm would exit 
the relevant market affects competition, this element has strong 
antitrust implications. 
E. The Different Standards Used by Antitrust Regulators and 
Bankruptcy Courts When Reviewing Offers for a Failing 
Firm 
Bankruptcy alone is not enough to invoke the failing firm 
defense.  A firm in bankruptcy is financially distressed, but that 
only satisfies the first two elements of the failing firm defense.  
The confusion arises from the fact that being unable to pay 
obligations in the near future and unable to reorganize 
successfully (“bankruptcy elements”) concern bankruptcy, 
whereas the alternative purchaser requirement and assets 
exiting the relevant market requirement (“antitrust elements”) 
concern antitrust law.  The inherent conflict between the 
bankruptcy elements and the antitrust elements makes the 
failing firm defense, as it currently stands, problematic for 
Antitrust Regulators and bankruptcy courts. 
Antitrust Regulators and bankruptcy courts use very 
different standards when reviewing offers for a failing firm.84  
“[A]ntitrust [R]egulators tend to favor the deal that best protects 
competition and keeps assets in service, even if that means 
creditors reclaim less money.”85  On the other hand, bankruptcy 
courts “usually favor the offer that returns the most money to the 
company’s creditors and other stakeholders, unless there is clear 
evidence that the deal would violate the antitrust laws.”86 
The inherent conflict between the bankruptcy elements  
and the antitrust elements of the failing firm defense  
makes it difficult for bankruptcy courts to determine what 
evidence would clearly show violation of the antitrust laws.   
In Dr. Pepper/Seven-Up Companies, Inc. v. Federal Trade 
 
83 See Zhong, supra note 29, at 772. 
84 See Charles Sisk, Rival Bids Imperil AMR Deal for TWA, DAILY DEAL (Feb. 
14, 2001), http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=900005527280&hbxlogin=1. 
85 Id. 
86 Id. 
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Commission,87 the owner of Canada Dry Bottling Company of 
New York and Pepsi Cola Bottling Company of New York, Inc. 
acquired Seven-Up Brooklyn’s soft drink franchises.88  Seven-Up 
Brooklyn had been “financially troubled for many years” until it 
filed for bankruptcy protection under Chapter 11.89  The 
bankruptcy court issued an order finding that “Seven-Up 
Brooklyn was a failed business unable ‘to recommence operations 
or continue in its normal course of business,’ ” and that the deal 
for the owner of Canada Dry Bottling Company and Pepsi Cola 
Bottling Company of New York “to acquire Seven-Up Brooklyn 
was ‘the only proposal that might provide for distribution to the 
unsecured creditors or the estate, even with the FTC approval 
process taken into consideration.’ ”90  Conversely, when the FTC 
challenged the acquisition in the district court, the court found 
that it was clear from the record that the FTC could rationally 
conclude that Seven-Up Brooklyn had failed to meet the 
requirements of the failing firm doctrine.91  The court held that 
Seven-Up had failed to establish that the proposed purchaser of 
Seven-Up Brooklyn’s soft drink franchises was the “only 
available purchaser” and rejected the merger.92  The district 
court acknowledged that although the company was bankrupt 
and had met the first two requirements of the failing firm 
defense, it did not meet the antitrust elements and, therefore, 
could not take advantage of the defense.93 
Dr. Pepper shows that a firm can be failing financially in 
bankruptcy, but still not meet all the requirements necessary for 
the failing firm defense.94  Failing financially is insufficient, as a 
matter of law, to sanction a merger shown by other evidence to be 
likely to lessen competition.95  This is because a firm’s financial 
failings have essentially no effect on its competitive position in 
 
87 798 F. Supp. 762 (D.D.C. 1992). 
88 See id. at 764. 
89 See id. at 765. 
90 Id. at 778–79. 
91 Id. at 779. 
92 Id. 
93 See id. at 778–79. 
94 See United States v. Pabst Brewing Co., 296 F. Supp. 994, 1003 (E.D. Wis. 
1969) (finding that even though the defendants “were in a very serious, even 
precarious, financial position at the time of the merger,” they nonetheless “failed to 
satisfy their burden of proving the material elements of the failing firm defense”). 
95 See Kwoka & Warren-Boulton, supra note 14, at 450. 
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the relevant market.96  In fact, a firm in bankruptcy “may remain 
in business indefinitely although it fails to cover total costs.”97  
Thus, “impending [financial] failure does not necessarily mean 
that a firm would in fact disappear from the market without the 
particular merger in question.”98   
III. PRACTICAL APPLICATION OF THE FAILING FIRM DEFENSE 
A recession causes many firms to experience financial 
distress.  Naturally, there are likely to be more bankruptcies 
during a recession than in years when the economy is stronger.99  
A bankruptcy sale is often the “exit strategy of choice for 
distressed companies and their suitors.”100  Bankruptcy sales also 
tend to raise failing firm issues.101 
Given the state of the economy, much merger and acquisition 
activity in the near future may involve companies in dire 
financial straits, raising the issue of whether antitrust regulators 
will be more sympathetic to the acquisition of failing firms.102  
“[T]here was speculation that the failing firm defense would be 
invoked more often and [that antitrust regulators] would relax 
the defense’s stringent requirements.”103  If the defense is 
relaxed, some firms might attempt to use poor economic 
conditions as a way to secure approval of what would otherwise 
be judged an anticompetitive merger.104 
 
96 See Zhong, supra note 29, at 772. 
97 G.E. Hale & Rosemary D. Hale, Failing Firms and the Merger Provisions of 
the Antitrust Laws, 52 KY. L.J. 597, 601 (1964). 
98 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 15, at 275. 
99 See Remarks by Shapiro, supra note 3, at 13. Between 2007 and 2008, about 
35,000 firms filed for bankruptcy. See Business and Nonbusiness Bankruptcy Cases 
Commenced, by Chapter of the Bankruptcy Code, During the Twelve Month Period 
Ended Sept. 30, 2008, http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/Statistics/ 
BankruptcyStatistics/BankruptcyFilings/2008/0908_f2.pdf; Business and 
Nonbusiness Bankruptcy Cases Commenced, by Chapter of the Bankruptcy Code, 
During the Twelve Month Period Ended Sept. 30, 2007, http://www.uscourts. 
gov/uscourts/Statistics/BankruptcyStatistics/BankruptcyFilings/2007/0907_f2.xls. 
This data includes bankruptcies leading to both liquidations and reorganizations. 
The number of bankruptcies rose from about 26,000 in 2007 to about 39,000 in 2008. 
100 See Ryan K. Cochran, et. al., Antitrust Concerns May Block Section 363 Sales 
Bankruptcy Court Orders May Not Be as Bulletproof as They Seem (May 14, 2009), 
http://www.turnaround.org/publications/articles.aspx?objectID=10957. 
101 See Nigro & Kanter, supra note 11, at 11. 
102 See Remarks by Shapiro, supra note 3, at 20. 
103 See Norris, supra note 27. 
104 See Remarks by Shapiro, supra note 3, at 20.  
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Part III of this Note explores how the 1992 version of the 
failing firm defense has been applied by antitrust regulators in a 
proposed bankruptcy merger, and how the failing firm defense 
may be applied after the new 2010 Merger Guidelines.  
Specifically, this section analyzes how antitrust regulators 
interpreting the failing firm defense have been deemphasizing 
the importance of the antitrust elements of the failing firm 
defense, thereby allowing firms that are only financially 
distressed to use the defense.  Part III.A explores the TWA and 
American Airlines merger and illustrates how the failing firm 
defense has been misapplied by antitrust regulators to allow 
firms that are only financially distressed to use the failing firm 
defense.  Part III.B explores how the 2010 Merger Guidelines will 
likely be interpreted by antitrust regulators and how the new 
guidelines might make it easier for firms which are failing 
financially to use the failing firm defense. 
A. Application of the 1992 Version of the Failing Firm Defense 
in the TWA and American Airlines Merger 
One of the leading sources of the failing firm confusion was 
the TWA and American Airlines merger.  The highly publicized 
merger proved that the failing firm defense was “alive and 
well,”105 but also that antitrust regulators are putting too much 
emphasis on bankruptcy to prove the defense.  This section 
analyzes the TWA and American Airlines merger, the antitrust 
regulators’ rationale for allowing the merger, and the bankruptcy 
test antitrust regulators used, which resulted in a misapplication 
of the 1992 version of the failing firm defense.  
1. Factual Background of the TWA and American Airlines 
Merger 
In early 2001, the plan for American Airlines to acquire the 
critically ailing TWA was confirmed after successful use of the 
failing firm defense.106  “TWA was in dire financial straits and 
American Airlines appeared to be its only and last financial hope 
before it succumbed to liquidation.”107  At the time, American 
Airlines was already the second-largest U.S. airline carrier, while 
 
105 Chefitz, supra note 23, at 219. 
106 See id.  
107 Bensel v. Allied Pilots Ass’n, 675 F. Supp. 2d 493, 494–95 (D.N.J. 2009). 
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TWA was the eighth-largest.108  According to the deal, American 
agreed “to pay approximately $500 million for about 190 TWA 
aircraft, 175 gates, and 173 slots across the country.”109  As part 
of the arrangement, TWA filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy 
protection from creditors.110  This marked the third time that 
cash-strapped TWA had filed for bankruptcy protection.111  
TWA’s bankruptcy filing sharply increased pressure on 
Antitrust Regulators to approve the deal because allegedly no 
other buyers had expressed interest and “TWA [was] one way or 
another going to disappear as a corporate entity.”112  Supporters 
of the merger looked at the deal not as a merger, but as a “rescue 
mission,” because “TWA [could not] be saved without America’s 
help.”113  The proponents focused primarily on saving jobs rather 
than the competitive consequences of the deal.114  Critics of the 
merger said that the deal was “unchecked airline arrogance and 
blatant disregard for the principles of competition.”115  Those 
opposing the merger were concerned that the deal would leave 
two dominant airlines in the U.S. air travel industry116 that 
would lead to higher airfares for consumers.117 
2. Antitrust Regulators Misapplied the 1992 Version of the 
Failing Firm Defense Because TWA Was Only Failing 
Financially 
Antitrust Regulators allowed the TWA and American 
Airlines merger to go forward without challenge although TWA 
was only financially distressed.  TWA was able to use the failing 
 
108 See Brian Knowlton, TWA’s Farewell Will Radically Alter U.S. Airline 
Market, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 11, 2001, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2001/01/ 
11/news/11iht-twa.2.t_1.html?pagewanted=print. 
109 Tim Johnson & Kim Khan, AMR Takes TWA Aboard, CNN MONEY (Jan. 10, 
2001), http://money.cnn.com/2001/01/10/deals/amr_twa/. See also Jim Abrams, 
Congress Weighs American-TWA Merger Fallout, ABC NEWS (Feb. 1, 2001), 
http://abcnews.go.com/US/story?id=94229&page=1. 
110 See Johnson & Khan, supra note 109; see also Knowlton, supra note 108. 
111 “TWA filed its first chapter 11 bankruptcy petition in 1992. It filed its second 
chapter 11 bankruptcy petition in 1995. TWA filed . . . its third chapter 11 
bankruptcy [petition] on January 10, 2001.” In re Trans World Airlines, Inc., No. 01-
00056(PJW), 2001 WL 1820326, at *2 (Bankr. D. Del. Apr. 2, 2001). 
112 Johnson & Khan, supra note 109; Knowlton, supra note 108. 
113 Abrams, supra note 109. 
114 See id.; see also Johnson & Khan, supra note 109. 
115 Johnson & Khan, supra note 109. 
116 See id.; see also Abrams, supra note 109. 
117 See Johnson & Khan, supra note 109; see also Knowlton, supra note 108. 
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firm defense because Antitrust Regulators misapplied the 
alternative purchaser and the assets exiting the relevant market 
requirements.  The bankruptcy court found: 
TWA was and has been in dire financial straights [sic] for a 
considerable period of time.  It had no real prospect for a 
standalone reorganization.  This is TWA’s third chapter 11 case 
in less than ten years and a sale of its business as a going 
concern is its only real hope for significant recoveries for 
significant segments of its creditor constituencies.118  
In this case, Antitrust Regulators were more concerned with 
the loss suffered by creditors instead of the potential loss of 
competition.119  In doing so, Antitrust Regulators misapplied the 
alternative purchaser requirement and the assets exiting the 
relevant market requirement of the failing firm defense.  These 
two requirements are the only requirements that have antitrust 
consequences.120  If Antitrust Regulators do not analyze the 
antitrust elements of the failing firm defense correctly, there is a 
risk that an anticompetitive merger will be approved wrongfully 
because “the financial condition of a firm is neither necessary nor 
sufficient” to use the failing firm defense.121  Loosening the strict 
requirement that a firm meet each element of the failing firm 
defense creates confusion in the doctrine.  Although TWA was 
financially distressed,122 it should not have been able to use the 
failing firm defense because there were alternative purchasers 
available and TWA’s assets would not have left the air 
transportation market.  
 
118 In re Trans World Airlines, Inc., No. 01-00056(PJW), 2001 WL 1820326, at *7 
(Bkrtcy. D. Del. 2001). “TWA has not earned a profit for over a decade” prior to the 
bankruptcy proceedings; “[i]t incurred operating losses of $29.26 million in 1997, 
$65.16 million in 1998, and $347.64 million in 1999.” Id. at *2. 
119 See id. at *6–7. 
120 See supra Part II.C–D. 
121 See Kwoka & Warren-Boulton, supra note 14, at 450. 
122 TWA showed that it was unable to meet its financial obligations in the near 
future and that it likely could not reorganize in bankruptcy. In re Trans World 
Airlines, 2001 WL 1820326, at *2 (Bankr. D. Del. 2001). TWA could not meet its 
operating expenses and “[t]he airline had less than a day’s cash flow on hand at the 
time of its bankruptcy filing.” Chefitz, supra note 23, at 223. Furthermore, “[TWA] 
evaluated various options, some very severe options that might have permitted TWA 
to survive as a going concern but as a scaled back airline” that were ultimately 
unsuccessful. Id. at 222.  
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a. Antitrust Regulators’ Misapplication of the Alternative 
Purchaser Requirement 
Antitrust Regulators found that there were no other 
alternative purchasers.  TWA was able to convince Antitrust 
Regulators of a well-documented “shopping story” to other less 
competitive purchasers in the pre-bankruptcy period.123  TWA 
contacted airline buyers and several non-airline buyers that 
might have an interest in purchasing TWA.124  TWA also 
explored “combinations such as . . . partnerships, and other 
strategic alliances.”125  Antitrust Regulators were also persuaded 
by TWA’s evidence that “the solicitations of potential bidders 
included a possible bankruptcy sale.”126  In the pre-bankruptcy 
period, the advantages of a potential bankruptcy sale were 
pointed out to all of the prospective purchasers that were 
contacted.127  In post-bankruptcy, TWA was able to supplement 
its pre-bankruptcy “shopping story” with an argument that there 
were no viable purchasers available because they “suffered from 
the same systemic deficiencies” that TWA faced, “and thus were 
neither viable nor credible.”128 
Antitrust Regulators misapplied the alternative purchaser 
requirement.  According to the 2010 Merger Guidelines, “[a]ny 
offer to purchase the assets of the failing firm for a price above 
the liquidation value of those assets will be regarded as a 
reasonable alternative offer.”129  Here, a number of alternative 
purchasers seemed to be available and sought opportunities to 
submit meaningful bids.130  It is well-documented that Carl Icahn 
submitted a competing bid for TWA and the bankruptcy court 
 
123 Chefitz, supra note 23, at 223. 
124 Id. at 222. “In their effort to find a strategic partner, TWA . . . approached 
more than seven airlines, including Delta, Continental, United and U.S. Air.” In re 
Trans World Airlines, 2001 WL 1820326, at *2. 
125 Chefitz, supra note 23, at 222. 
126 Id. at 223. 
127 Id. 
128 See In re Trans World Airlines, 2001 WL 1820326, at *8, *10; see also Chefitz, 
supra note 23, at 223. 
129 2010 HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 9, at 32 n.16. 
130 Once the deal was announced, Continental Airlines said it would pay 
between $300 and $400 million for certain gates, slots and other assets, while Jet 
Acquisitions said it had planned to offer nearly $1 billion to keep TWA “independent 
and financially viable.” Sisk, supra note 84. Moreover, Northwest Airlines had said 
it wanted TWA’s stake in Worldspan L.P., a reservation service. Id. 
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rejected that proposal as not being a “viable” offer.131  Instead of 
determining if the bid price was above the liquidation value, 
Antitrust Regulators decided to look at whether the bids were 
viable or meritorious.132  Antitrust Regulators, like the 
bankruptcy court, determined that if competing bids would suffer 
from the same systemic deficiencies that TWA suffered from, it 
was not a valid offer.133  Evaluating whether an offer is viable 
directly conflicts with the explicit wording of the 2010 
Guidelines, which states “[a]ny offer . . . above the liquidation 
value . . . will be regarded as a reasonable alternative offer.”134  
This would also disregard the fact that it would defy reasonable 
business judgment for a firm to make an offer that is not viable.  
As a less detrimental alternative purchaser, Carl Icahn should 
have been free to make structural changes to TWA or sell TWA’s 
assets piecemeal, and his bid should have been accepted.  Thus, 
Antitrust Regulators misapplied the alternative purchaser 
requirement to the failing firm defense. 
b. Antitrust Regulators’ Misapplication of the Assets Exiting 
Requirement 
Antitrust Regulators found that the assets-exiting-the-
relevant-market requirement was satisfied.  TWA was able to 
convince Antitrust Regulators that, “but for th[e] merger between 
American and TWA and American’s assumption of [TWA’s] St. 
Louis hub and some of the other markets and services offered by 
TWA, many assets would exit the market [for consumer air 
transportation in the United States] entirely.”135  TWA claimed 
that the deal would preserve twenty thousand jobs and retiree 
benefits that would otherwise be lost.136  Moreover, TWA claimed 
that if it “were split up and . . . its assets were sold 
piecemeal, . . . [the] hub in St. Louis would disappear” from the 
air transportation market.137 
 
 
131 See In re Trans World Airlines, 2001 WL 1820326, at *10. 
132 See id. 
133 See id. 
134 2010 HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 9, at 32 n.16 (emphasis 
added). 
135 Chefitz, supra note 23, at 224. 
136 See In re Trans World Airlines, 2001 WL 1820326, at *3, *5. 
137 Chefitz, supra note 23, at 224. 
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Antitrust Regulators also misapplied the requirement that 
the allegedly failing firm’s assets would have exited the relevant 
market without the acquisition.  If assets could be expected to 
remain in the market in any way, “then acquisition of those 
assets by a leading firm would raise conventional antitrust 
concerns.”138  Here, TWA admits that it was only able to prove 
that “many” assets would exit the air transportation market.139  
This is not enough to prove that the assets of a firm would exit 
the market absent the acquisition because there are assets that 
would likely not exit the market. 
First, TWA’s airplanes would not have exited the air 
transportation market.  A commercial airplane will not disappear 
from the air transportation market because another airline or an 
independent company that sells used airplanes and airplane 
parts would purchase it.  “If [a] firm owns important assets 
whose value is greatest in their current use, these assets are 
unlikely to exit the market, even if the firm cannot meet its 
financial obligations in the near future.”140  Rather than exit, 
productive assets like airplanes are likely to continue serving 
their productive function.141  It follows that airplanes will not 
“disappear from the face of the earth,” but will instead “fly until 
they die.” 142  Thus, the airplanes from TWA would have been 
used in the air transportation market by competitors who bought 
airplanes piecemeal or by independent dealers who would sell 
airplanes in the air transportation market had the merger not 
taken place. 
Second, TWA employees would not have all lost jobs and 
disappeared from the air transportation market.  There is no 
reason to believe “that in any aggregate sense jobs are lost or 
communities necessarily disrupted” when a firm fails 
financially.143  If there are still productive assets like airplanes, 
the assets will tend to continue to serve their productive function 
and “continue to employ roughly as many people as they 
employed before.”144  Thus, most of the former TWA employees 
 
138 See Kwoka & Warren-Boulton, supra note 14, at 445. 
139 Chefitz, supra note 23, at 224. 
140 See Remarks by Shapiro, supra note 3, at 21.  
141 See William F. Baxter, Remarks: The Failing Firm Doctrine, 50 ANTITRUST 
L.J. 247, 249 (1982). 
142 Id. 
143 Id. 
144 Id. 
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would likely still be employed to support the airplanes that 
would be used in the air transportation market by other 
competitors.  Even if some jobs were lost, not all twenty thousand 
jobs would have disappeared and therefore exited the market. 
3. What Should Have Happened with the TWA and American 
Airlines Merger  
Because the TWA and American Airlines merger did not 
satisfy all of the requirements of the failing firm defense, it 
would have been preferable to allow TWA to fail and have its 
assets more widely dispersed throughout the market.145  TWA’s 
assets could have been poached piecemeal by smaller competitors 
keeping those assets in the relevant market.146  While American 
may have had sufficient resources to acquire TWA in its entirety, 
“many competitors may have [had] the resources to acquire the 
strategic assets” from TWA “that they value[d] the most.”147  The 
bankruptcy court even stated, “[t]he sale of TWA as a going 
concern avoided the most likely alternative, which was the 
piecemeal liquidation of individual assets.”148  If TWA was “forced 
to liquidate in a bankruptcy sale and sell its assets piecemeal to 
the highest bidder, smaller competitors [might have] purchase[d] 
and more productively use[d] [TWA’s] assets, which in turn 
[would have] enabled them to compete away market share from 
the market leader,” American Airlines.149  Moreover, smaller 
competitors and new entrants might have benefitted from TWA’s 
assets being sold piecemeal because they would be in a better 
position to compete with American for TWA’s released 
customers.150 
B. Potential Confusion From the Revised 2010 Merger 
Guidelines 
The 2010 Merger Guidelines have seemed to relax the 
stringent requirements of the failing firm defense in the 1992 
Merger Guidelines.  Revisions in the Horizontal Merger 
 
145 See AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 15, at 275–76. 
146 See Johnson & Khan, supra note 109. 
147 See Paredes, supra note 7, at 369–70. 
148 In re Trans World Airlines, Inc., No. 01-00056(PJW), 2001 WL 1820326, at *5 
(Bkrtcy. D. Del. 2001).  
149 See Paredes, supra note 7, at 369–70. 
150 See id. at 370. 
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Guidelines are supposed to reflect changes in enforcement 
policy.151  The 2010 revisions will create much confusion in the 
failing firm doctrine because they differ from the 1992 Merger 
Guidelines on the interpretation of the assets-exiting-the 
relevant-market requirement.152  This section will analyze the 
difference between the 1992 and 2010 Horizontal Merger 
Guidelines, and briefly explore why the Horizontal Merger 
Guidelines should not be loosened in a distressed economy. 
1. Difference Between the 1992 and the 2010 Merger 
Guidelines 
The main difference between the 1992 and the 2010 Merger 
Guidelines is that the 2010 Merger Guidelines do not explicitly 
list as an element that absent the acquisition, the assets of the 
failing firm would exit the relevant market.153  Instead, the 2010 
Merger Guidelines say “[t]he Agencies do not normally credit 
claims that the assets of the failing firm would exit the relevant 
market” unless the firm is “unable to pay its financial obligations 
in the near future,” “would not be able to reorganize 
successfully,” and could not find an alternative purchaser that 
would pose a less severe danger to competition.154  Although all of 
the elements from the 1992 Merger Guidelines seem to be 
present in the 2010 Merger Guidelines, there may be two 
interpretations of the new guidelines. 
One interpretation of the 2010 Merger Guidelines is that 
nothing has changed.  All of the elements seem to be included in 
the guidelines and Antitrust Regulators may not change the way 
they analyze the failing firm defense at all.  Antitrust Regulators 
may interpret the guidelines to mean that if the first three 
elements are met, then Antitrust Regulators will take those 
three elements into account when analyzing whether the assets 
of the failing firm would exit the relevant market absent the 
acquisition.  If nothing has changed in the failing firm defense, it 
is confusing why Antitrust Regulators changed the wording of 
the 1992 Merger Guidelines.155 
 
151 2010 HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES,  supra note 9, at 1 n.1. 
152 See supra Part I. 
153 See supra Part I. 
154 2010 HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 9, at 32. 
155 See supra Part I. 
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Another more likely interpretation of the 2010 Merger 
Guidelines is that the defense has changed significantly.  While 
substantively the 1992 and 2010 Merger Guidelines appear 
similar, the change in wording alone signals that something is 
different or else Antitrust Regulators would not have changed 
the wording from the 1992 version.156  Antitrust Regulators may 
interpret the guidelines to mean that the failing firm defense 
does not require analyzing whether the assets of a firm would 
exit the relevant market as a separate element.  Instead, 
Antitrust Regulators may determine that if the three elements in 
the 2010 Guidelines are met, then the assets-exiting-the-
relevant-market element is automatically met.  This 
interpretation would confirm the holding of the TWA case and 
substantially loosen the strict requirements of the 1992 Merger 
Guidelines because now one less requirement of the 1992 Merger 
Guidelines needs to be met.  More importantly, the assets-
exiting-the-relevant-market requirement is an antitrust 
element,157 which would tilt the balance of the failing firm 
defense toward a bankruptcy application.  If the assets-exiting-
the-relevant-market requirement is not included in Antitrust 
Regulators’ analysis, the defense only requires a firm failing 
financially to prove that there is no alternative purchaser that is 
less detrimental to competition.  This would allow a firm to use 
poor economic conditions as a way to secure approval of what 
would otherwise be judged an anticompetitive merger.158 
Because the Horizontal Merger Guidelines have been 
“revised from time to time . . . to reflect changes in enforcement 
policy [or] to clarify aspects of existing policy,”159 confusion has 
occurred not just for lawyers, but for the courts as well.  Even in 
bad economic times, the “strict requirements” of the failing firm 
defense “should not be loosened to address the circumstances of a 
distressed [economy or] industry.”160  Critics of the 2010 Merger 
Guidelines say that the guidelines are “neither a complete and 
accurate description of what [the] enforcement staff considers in 
 
156 See id. 
157 See supra Part II.E. 
158 Remarks by Shapiro, supra note 3, at 20. 
159 2010 HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 9, at 1 n.1. 
160 See Nigro & Kanter, supra note 11, at 2. 
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merger investigations, nor a helpful guide to courts.”161  Although 
the purpose of the Horizontal Merger Guidelines is to “provide 
more clarity and transparency,”162 they seem to have done the 
opposite in regards to the failing firm defense.  
2. Applying the Failing Firm Defense in a Bad Economy 
An economic downturn may lead to more proposed mergers 
between financially distressed firms, but it does not imply that 
looser standards ought to be applied when analyzing them.163  
Firms that are losing money have to satisfy the conditions 
demanded by the failing firm defense “even when the overall 
economy is going through very difficult times.”164  Antitrust 
Regulators should apply a rigorous failing firm defense during a 
downturn because a recession can facilitate strong growth in 
long-term productivity.165  An economic downturn tends to drive 
out the less efficient market players, unlike a boom, where 
inefficient players may not only survive, but grow.166 
Antitrust Regulators “cannot and should not look the other 
way when faced with practices or proposed combinations that 
will harm competition and consumers in the long run.”167  
Keeping markets competitive during hard economic times is no 
less important than during normal economic times.168  “Although 
a weak economy may mean that more transactions will pass 
muster” under the failing firm defense, “those that do not should 
be blocked in troubled economic times for the same reasons they 
 
161 See Sheri Qualters, New Merger Guidelines Will Likely Lead to a More Fluid 
Review Process, NAT’L L. J. (Aug. 23, 2010), http://www.law.com/jsp/nlj/ 
PubArticleNLJ.jsp?id=1202470948967&slreturn=1. Conversely, Department of 
Justice Antitrust Chief Christine Varney said that the guidelines “better reflect the 
agencies’ actual practices,” and FTC Chairman Jon Leibowitz “praised their ‘ clarity 
and predictability.’ ” Jenna Greene, New Merger Guidelines Prompt Harsh Response 
from FTC’s Rosch, THE BLT: THE BLOG OF LEGAL TIMES (Aug. 19, 2010, 4:08 PM), 
http://legaltimes.typepad.com/blt/2010/08/new-merger-guidelines-prompt-harsh-
response-from-ftcs-rosch.html. 
162 Assam, supra note 32, at 231. 
163 The same basic principles of antitrust economics apply during a recession as 
apply during an economic expansion. See Remarks by Shapiro, supra note 3. 
Additionally, the ultimate goals of the antitrust laws protecting competition and 
consumers do not change during an economic downturn. 
164 See HEYER & KIMMEL, supra note 48. 
165 Remarks by Shapiro, supra note 3, at 18 n.34. 
166 Id. 
167 Id. at 17. 
168 Id. at 2. 
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should be blocked in more ‘normal’ times.”169  If not, “[there] 
would be a reduction in competition and harm to consumers and 
the economy as a whole.”170  
While recessions are temporary, mergers can permanently 
eliminate competitors.171  “[T]here is always harm from blocking 
a merger that would have cut the costs of the firm that had been 
failing.”172  “[B]ecause it is easier to redeploy assets in booming 
times than in downturns,” “such a cost is relatively high during 
an economic downturn.”173  Alternatively, “the cost of allowing a 
merger to create market power is greater during a 
downturn . . . since entry may be likelier during a boom.”174  
Because of the high costs associated with rejecting a merger 
during an economic downturn, Antitrust Regulators must 
analyze the failing firm defense carefully and consistently. 
IV. EXITING ASSETS DEFENSE 
The change in the 2010 Merger Guidelines will lead to 
continued problems for Antitrust Regulators when applying the 
elements of the failing firm defense.  Moreover, the 2010 Merger 
Guidelines show that the defense is beginning to look more like a 
bankruptcy test when the defense should instead be focused on 
antitrust law. The fact that the failing firm defense continues to 
create confusion indicates that some modifications to the 2010 
Merger Guidelines are in order.  The inquiry should not include 
whether the target is failing financially.  A failing firm defense 
that focuses on financials ignores the more critical antitrust 
questions.  Because the failing firm defense is firmly engrained 
in antitrust law, the defense should focus solely on antitrust 
principles.  Thus, an “Exiting Assets Defense” is needed to ensure 
competitive markets and that the defense is applied consistently 
by Antitrust Regulators. 
Particularly in a time when Antitrust Regulators will be 
faced with a large number of proposed mergers where the failing 
firm defense may be offered, it is important to understand the 
principles underlying the defense and the appropriate framework 
 
169 HEYER & KIMMEL, supra note 48, at 1. 
170 Id. 
171 Remarks by Shapiro, supra note 3, at 15. 
172 HEYER & KIMMEL, supra note 48, at 11. 
173 Id. 
174 Id. 
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for analyzing merging firms in some form of financial distress.175  
This Part proposes a three-step solution to the failing firm 
defense confusion.  Part IV.A discusses why it is necessary to 
change the name of the failing firm defense  to the “Exiting 
Assets Defense.”  Part IV.B explains why the failing firm defense 
should remove the bankruptcy elements.  Part IV.C explains why 
the failing firm defense should only include the antitrust 
elements of the defense.  Finally, Part IV.D suggests how the 
guidelines should be revised to include the “Exiting Assets 
Defense.” 
A. Step 1 - Change the Name of the Failing Firm Defense to the 
“Exiting Assets Defense” 
The actual failing firm defense title should be changed to the 
“Exiting Assets Defense.”176  It is perhaps more accurate to refer 
to the failing firm defense as an “Exiting Assets Defense” because 
“permitting [a] merger may . . . be anticompetitive” “[i]f the 
assets would likely remain in the market—even if in the hands of 
some other player.”177  Additionally, the defense will not apply 
unless the assets-exiting-the-relevant-market requirement is 
met. 
The word “failing” also causes confusion.  One definition of 
“fail” is “to become bankrupt or insolvent.”178  Although this is 
only one definition of the word “failing,” it explains why judges, 
lawyers and even Antitrust Regulators believe that a firm in 
bankruptcy can use the failing firm defense.  Thus, simply 
changing the name from the failing firm defense to the “Exiting 
Assets Defense” would provide more clarity to the defense.  
Moreover, the name change could lead to judicial economy 
through less litigation on the failing firm defense issue.  
Currently, the failing firm defense is often raised, but it is rarely 
successful.179  Under the new “Exiting Assets Defense,” however, 
 
175 Id. at 1. 
176 In Olin Corp. v. FTC, 986 F.2d 1295, 1307 (9th Cir. 1993), Olin proposed the 
use of an “exiting assets” defense. The court stated that “The key element of such a 
defense is proof that, without the merger, the assets owned by the acquired firm 
would shortly be leaving the market.” Id. 
177 HEYER & KIMMEL, supra note 48, at 5. 
178 Failing Definition, MERRIAM-WEBSTER.COM, http://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/fail?show=0&t=1287343247 (last visited Feb. 9, 2012). 
179 The defense has proven successful in only a small number of court cases. See, 
e.g., Union Leader Corp. v. Newspapers of New England Inc., 284 F.2d 582, 589–90 
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lawyers would understand that the defense requires the assets of 
the firm to exit the market rather than the firm to be merely 
financially distressed.  A greater understanding of the 
limitations of the defense will lead to less litigation on whether a 
firm is failing. 
B. Step 2 - Remove the Bankruptcy Elements from the Failing 
Firm Defense 
The bankruptcy elements of the failing firm defense, which 
focus on whether a firm is financially distressed, should be 
removed from the Horizontal Merger Guidelines.  A firm is 
financially distressed if: (1) it is “unable to meet its financial 
obligations in the near future” and (2) it is unable “to reorganize 
[in bankruptcy] successfully.”180  These two elements of the 
failing firm defense do not have any effect on antitrust law 
because a firm’s financial failing has little impact on a firm’s 
competitive position.181  Indeed, “[f]inancial weakness, while 
perhaps relevant in some cases, is probably the weakest ground 
of all for justifying a merger,” and “certainly cannot be the 
primary justification” for permitting one.182  While being unable 
to pay bills or to reorganize is often a precursor to a firm’s assets 
potentially exiting the relevant market, financial distress alone is 
not an antitrust defense.183  “It is, therefore, apparent that the 
financial condition of a firm is neither necessary nor sufficient for 
a per se defense for merger.”184 
C. Step 3 - Keep the Antitrust Elements from the Failing Firm 
Defense 
The failing firm defense should focus solely on the 
requirements that have antitrust implications. The elements of 
the failing firm defense that have an antitrust effect are: (1) the 
alternative purchaser requirement and (2) the assets-exiting-the- 
 
(1st Cir. 1960); California v. Sutter Health Sys., 130 F. Supp. 2d 1109, 1133 (N.D. 
Cal. 2001); Reilly v. Hearst Corp., 107 F. Supp. 2d 1192, 1205 (N.D. Cal. 2000); FTC 
v. Great Lakes Chem. Corp., 528 F. Supp. 84, 96–98 (N.D. Ill. 1981). 
180 2010 HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 9, at 32. 
181 See Zhong, supra note 29, at 772; see also supra Part II.A–B. 
182 Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp. v. FTC, 652 F.2d 1324, 1339, 1341 (7th Cir. 
1981). 
183 See Remarks by Shapiro, supra note 3, at 19. 
184 See Kwoka & Warren-Boulton, supra note 14, at 450. 
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relevant-market requirement.185  Unlike the bankruptcy 
elements of the failing firm defense, these elements have a direct 
effect on antitrust regulation.186  Thus, the failing firm defense 
should weigh heavily, if not exclusively, on these two elements.  
These two elements are essential to the failing firm defense 
because they help focus the defense on protecting competition 
rather than protecting anticompetitive transactions involving 
firms in financial distress. 
1. The Importance of the Alternative Purchaser Requirement 
The requirement to make a good-faith effort to find an 
alternative purchaser protects against the loss of competition.187  
If an alternative purchaser could be interested, “a unit in the 
competitive system would be preserved and not lost to monopoly 
power.”188  The main way the alternative purchaser requirement 
protects against the loss of competition is by rejecting market 
power premiums. 
The alternative purchaser requirement protects against 
“market power premiums.” A market power premium is “a 
payment for anticipated gains in market power.”189  “An 
acquiring company willing to pay a market power premium [is] 
betting on higher prices from increased concentration through 
oligopolistic interdependence . . . .”190  Competitor-purchasers will 
likely argue that they are willing to pay a higher premium 
because it is actually an efficiency premium.191  Some of these 
offers may include efficiency premiums, but it is difficult to 
separate a market power premium from an efficiency premium.192  
Although the alternative purchaser requirement may block some 
mergers that could potentially lead to efficiencies, conventional  
 
 
185 2010 HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 9, at 32. 
186 See supra Part II.C–D. 
187 See Correia, supra note 36, at 693. 
188 Citizen Publ’g Co. v. United States, 394 U.S. 131, 138 (1969). 
189 Correia, supra note 36, at 694. 
190 Id. An “oligopoly” is “a market situation in which each of a few producers 
affects but does not control the market.” Oligopoly Definition, MERRIAM-
WEBSTER.COM, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/oligopolistic (last visited 
Feb. 9, 2012). 
191 See Correia, supra note 36, at 694. 
192 See William Blumenthal, Thirty-One Merger Policy Questions Still Lingering 
After the 1992 Guidelines, 38 ANTITRUST BULL. 593, 638 (1993). 
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merger analysis is based on “probabilities, not certainties.”193  
Thus, even a significant risk of interdependence warrants 
blocking a merger. 
2. The Importance of the Assets-Exiting-the-Relevant-Market 
Requirement 
The requirement that the allegedly failing firm’s assets will 
exit the relevant market absent the acquisition is the best 
protection against the loss of competition.  This is a difficult 
requirement to meet because “impending [financial] failure does 
not necessarily mean that the firm would in fact disappear from 
the market without the particular merger in question.”194  This is 
because a firm “might survive bankruptcy reorganization with 
little or no durable loss in market position, or it might be 
purchased by outside interests that would preserve or even 
enhance its competitive impact, particularly if the outside 
interests purchased it at a lower price than its current burden of 
debt.”195  In looking at whether a firm will exit the relevant 
market, Antitrust Regulators should consider whether a firm can 
pay its obligations in the near future and reorganize in 
bankruptcy.  Although Antitrust Regulators should consider the 
bankruptcy elements when determining whether the assets- 
exiting-the-relevant-market requirement is met, they are not 
necessary to prove the new defense. 
Under this requirement, the assets should be certain to exit 
the relevant market.  The acquisition of assets by a leading firm 
would raise antitrust concerns “[i]f those assets could be expected 
to remain in the market in some other hands—either a somehow 
rejuvenated original firm, a new firm, or even a firm with a 
smaller market share.”196  “But if the assets of the failing firm 
would otherwise leave the market, the effect of the acquisition is 
to increase capacity in the market relative to the alternative of 
exit.”197  This is important because antitrust law would prefer the 
assets to stay in the relevant market in any capacity, rather than 
to allow an anticompetitive merger. 
 
193 Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 323 (1962). 
194 See AREEDA &  HOVENKAMP, supra note 15, at 275. 
195 See id. at 275–76. 
196 Kwoka & Warren-Boulton, supra note 14, at 445. 
197 Id. at 445 (emphasis omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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Requiring exit from the relevant market is also a bright line 
rule that may avoid some of the confusion associated with the 
failing firm defense.  Because the failing firm defense is a narrow 
exception, complete exit from the market would be the most 
drastic and least plausible scenario.198  If some assets were able 
to stay in the relevant market in any way, then the failing firm 
defense should not be applicable at all.  Thus, a bright line rule 
that requires complete collapse is probably more predictable than 
slow decline and future estimates.199 
D. Revised Horizontal Merger Guidelines 
The current failing firm defense should be abolished, and the 
new “Assets Exiting Defense” premised upon a two-prong 
analysis should be incorporated into the Guidelines: 
Section 11: Exiting Assets 
A merger is not likely to create or enhance market power or 
facilitate its exercise if the following circumstances are met by 
the target firm: 
(1) it has made unsuccessful good-faith efforts to elicit 
reasonable alternative offers of acquisition of the assets that 
would both keep tangible and intangible assets in the relevant 
market and pose a less severe danger to competition than does 
the proposed merger, and  
(2) absent the acquisition, its assets would exit the relevant 
market. 
CONCLUSION 
The failing firm defense has been firmly embedded in 
antitrust law since its creation in International Shoe in 1930.  
The defense should focus exclusively on antitrust principles and 
not become an escape hatch for anticompetitive transactions of 
firms that are in financial distress.  The purpose of the failing 
firm defense should be to protect competition, not to protect firms 
from failing in a distressed economy.  A stronger “Assets Exiting 
Defense” would ensure that Antitrust Regulators do not apply 
the defense too broadly and refocus the current failing firm 
defense on its original purpose, to protect competition. 
 
198 See Correia, supra note 36, at 686, 689. 
199 See id. at 689. 
